the process

four steps, every app.

the same route for every app. the numbers under each station are what reached it across the pilot so far.

  1. 35,854scanstatic analysis of the public build
  2. 384verifya person confirms it is real and live
  3. 384reportprivately, to the owner or the cert
  4. 19fixre-verified on the next build
what reaches each station, across the pilot so far
  1. 01

    scan

    proactive, at scale

    large-scale static analysis of public apks across countries and sectors, including the apps that run no security program at all.

    • public builds only, fetched the way any user would
    • no login, no account, no interaction with a live service
    • about 14.4 apps a minute per worker; a sweep of 1,500 apps takes under two hours
  2. 02

    triage

    human verification

    every candidate is confirmed by hand. test keys, sample configs and public identifiers are dismissed before anything is reported.

    • is it live? is it really a secret? does it really belong to this owner?
    • placeholders, sdk samples and public identifiers are thrown out
    • in a recent sweep, 540 flags became 6 reports
  3. 03

    report

    responsible disclosure

    we write to the owner privately, or to the national cert where the owner is a public body, with evidence and remediation guidance.

    • what we observed, where, and how to confirm it
    • a redacted copy of the secret, never the whole thing in the open
    • what rotating it involves, and what else to check
  4. 04

    coordinate

    until it is fixed

    we stay available, re-verify once a fix ships, and follow each organisation's own disclosure or bounty process where one exists.

    • the cert or owner leads on timelines
    • we re-download the new build and confirm the secret is gone
    • nothing is ever published while the flaw is live
our principles

four rules.

report privately first

issues go to the owner, or to the national cert for public bodies. nothing goes public while a flaw is live.

static, read-only, good faith

we never exploit findings, access user data, or disrupt services. we confirm exposure; we never overstate it.

secrets stay secret

we never publish credentials or keys. full evidence is shared with the owner over a secure channel, under nda where asked.

coordinate the fix

we stay available, re-verify once a fix ships, and let the cert or owner lead on timelines.

boundaries

what we never do.

these are the lines we do not cross, on any app, for any reason.

  • exploit a finding, or go beyond what is needed to confirm exposure
  • access, download or retain real user data
  • disrupt, degrade or load-test a live service
  • name an affected app, organisation or developer while a flaw is live
  • publish a credential, key or anything that could be used to exploit an issue
  • overstate impact: we state confirmed exposure and leave the severity call to the owner
  • ask for payment to withhold or delay a report